

CLEARANCE DIVISION
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

Approved For Release 2001/05/02 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700010020-8

Staff & Operations Branch

Approved For Release 2001/05/02 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700010020-8

CLEARANCE DIVISION

STAFF AND OPERATIONS BRANCH

Organization & Staffing

The Staff and Operations Branch will be composed of three sections, e.g., Staff Evaluation Section (CD/1), Support Evaluation Section (CD/2), and Operational Evaluation Section (CD/3). The Branch Chief's office will consist of Chief, Deputy, secretary and security control clerk.

Staff Evaluation Section will consist of [REDACTED] clerk-stenos and [REDACTED] total of nine persons. This section will process all professional and clerical staff applicants, staff agent conversions, and consultants.

Support Evaluation Section will consist of [REDACTED] professionals, [REDACTED] persons. This section will process all other cases having staff-like access and those who will not have such access, but are not considered as being used in a covert capacity. The type of cases to be processed by this section will be Career Associates (staff-like), Contract Type (Internal), Military Assignees, Civilian Detailees, Independent Contractors, [REDACTED] and OTR Language Instructors.

Operational Evaluation Section will consist of [REDACTED] sionals, [REDACTED] clerk for a [REDACTED] persons. This section will handle all operational type clearance actions. The types of cases handled will be Operational Approvals, Covert Security Approvals, Proprietary Approvals, Special Inquiries and Covert Name Checks.

Case Control

The case control cards currently used by ID will continue to be utilized with additional internal control data stamped on the back for desk supervisor use, i.e., to record actions after the case has been closed by the field. The case will be controlled from its receipt in SRD and throughout its travels both internally and in the field by the appropriate Section designation, i.e. CD/1, CD/2, and CD/3. There will be a control clerk who will maintain an alphabetical and numerical

control for each of the Sections. Through this system each desk supervisor will control the case assigned to him from the time the case is received in the Branch from SRD until such time as the final clearance is granted. Internal dissemination of case material will be by the Section control clerk based on alphabetical letter designation assigned to each desk supervisor in each Section.

It is anticipated that the majority of clearance requests will continue to be received initially in SRD. Clearance requests received directly by the Clearance Division or Staff and Operations Branch will be processed as before, i.e., the case will be forwarded to SRD for recording and initial processing and then to the appropriate Section in Staff and Operations Branch for input into the Clearance Division case control system.

Case Management

The case officer approach will be utilized with each desk supervisor scheduling and supervising the field investigation, evaluating the completed case and making an appropriate clearance recommendation. The desk supervisor responsibility will include contact with representatives of the requesting office as appropriate.

The desk supervisor will sign off for the Chief, Clearance Division, in completely clear cases, subject to review by the Branch Chief or Deputy Branch Chief. In cases involving recommendation for referral to the Applicant Review Panel, a sign off at the Division level will be required. If a desk supervisor recommends a security disapproval and the recommendation is concurred in at either the Branch or Division level, the case must be forwarded to the DD/PSI for final determination. All security disapprovals must be concurred in by DD/PSI. Notification of the final decision on a case will be done by the Staff and Operations Branch in the name of the Chief, Clearance Division.

Work Flow

No basic change from that in effect at the present time (See Tab A).

Implementation

Phase I

Implementation In Place

1. X-20 working days. Indoctrination period for clerical and professional personnel.
2. X-10 working days. Notification to field of minor changes in letter of assignment and changes in control designation.
3. X-10 working days. Notification to requesters regarding new control designations (primarily for covert cases).
4. X-10 working days. Revision of forms - several forms will immediately be eliminated and other currently used forms can be annotated to reflect changes.

Phase II

Complete Implementation

Complete implementation (movement of personnel, equipment, etc.) depends entirely upon space availability which is the subject of a separate paper.


CLEARANCE DIVISION

STAFF AND OPERATIONS BRANCH

WORK FLOW CHART


I

Processing of Clearance Requests
and Scheduling Investigations



II


Administration of
Field Investigations



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III

Evaluation
of Cases



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Industrial & Certification Branch

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CLEARANCE DIVISION

INDUSTRIAL AND CERTIFICATION BRANCH

Organization & Staffing

The Industrial and Certification Branch will be composed of three sections, e. g., Industrial Approval Section (CD/4), Services Section (CD/5), and Certification Section (CD/6).

Industrial Approval Section will be responsible for managing all types of Industrial Approvals which were formerly managed by the Special Clearance Branch of ID and the Clearance Support Branch of FSD (SAA, ISA, and ISSA). Staffing will consist of [REDACTED]

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Services Section will be responsible for managing Facility Access Approval cases, DCS cases, "Q" clearance and JPRS cases. Staffing will consist of [REDACTED].

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Certification Section will be responsible for Marriage cases, Special Clearance actions, VNE Badge Approvals, Clearance Certifications, Overseas Approval actions, and other file review actions currently performed by the Employee Actions Section. In addition, the Certification Section will assume management of the Liaison Approval Program formerly handled by the Employee Activity Branch. Staffing for this section will consist of [REDACTED]

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The staffing proposed for the three sections of the Industrial and Certification Branch should be considered a flexible one which can be adjusted as the work experience dictates.

Case Control

All cases requiring field investigation and/or name checks will be controlled in each section by means of the case control cards presently being utilized by the Investigations Division. This card will assist the sections in preparing monthly statistics and would not necessitate any change in [REDACTED] procedures. The Industrial and Certification Branch plans to list the following designations in that block on the case control card captioned "Type":

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SAA-CD/4 (Security Access Approvals)
IST-CD/4 (Industrial Security Top Secret)
ISS-CD/4 (Industrial Security Secret)
FAA-CD/5 (Facility Access Approvals)
NCC-CD/5 (DCS-citizen cases)
NCA-CD/5 (DCS-alien cases)
NCJ-CD/5 (JPRS)
SIM-CD/6 (Marriage cases)
NCS-CD/6 (Special Clearance Non USIB)
NCB-CD/6 (Badge)


The above designations will be coordinated with Chief, SRD, in order that he can instruct his personnel on the new designations to be placed on the control cards.

The control clerks will utilize these cards to control all cases involving field investigation and/or name checks and will post all pertinent actions on this card until the case is closed.

The remaining actions of the Branch, which involve file reviews only, will be controlled by means of a duplicate charge out card as is presently the case.

Case Management

Desk supervisors will be responsible for the management of each case assigned to them from its inception to completion. He



Desk supervisors will prepare a memorandum in any case they consider questionable setting forth appropriate information pertaining to the approval or clearance involved, the individual's background, pertinent information developed from the investigation or polygraph, and his recommendation as to whether the approval/clearance should be granted or denied. Should the desk supervisor recommend approval, and this recommendation be concurred in by the Deputy Branch Chief and the Branch Chief, the latter should have the authority to grant the approval. However, if the desk supervisor recommends a security disapproval and the recommendation is concurred in at either the Branch or Division level, the case must be forwarded to the DD/PSI for final determination. All security disapprovals must be concurred in by DD/PSI.

Work Flow

No basic change from that in effect at the present time (See Tab B attached).

Implementation

Phase I

Implementation In Place

1. X-20 working days. Cross-orientation of professionals and clerical personnel in the Special Clearance Branch and the Clearance Support Branch on work involved in each Branch.
2. X-10 working days. Consolidation of control cards presently utilized in Special Clearance Branch and Clearance Support Branch and establishment of one control system.
3. X-10 working days. Notification to [REDACTED] of any changes in procedures that would affect them.
4. X-10 working days. Notification to interested components of the Agency of any change in procedures which would affect them.

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Phase II


Complete Implementation

Complete implementation (movement of personnel, equipment, etc.) depends entirely upon space availability, which is the subject of a separate paper.


CLEARANCE DIVISION INDUSTRIAL AND CERTIFICATION BRANCH

WORK FLOW CHART


I Processing of Clearance Requests and Scheduling Investigations



II Administration of Field Investigations



III Evaluation of Cases



Research Branch

CLEARANCE DIVISION

RESEARCH BRANCH

Organization & Staffing

The Research Branch will be composed of two sections, the Reinvestigation Section (CD/7) and the Counterintelligence Section (CD/8).

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Case Control

The case control for the Research Branch will consist of two independent administrative controls.

The Reinvestigation Section administrative case control will be identical with the case control for the Industrial and Certification Branch. All cases requiring field investigation and/or name checks by the Reinvestigation Section will be controlled by means of the case control cards presently being utilized by the Investigations Division. These cards will assist the section in preparing monthly statistics and will not necessitate any change in field office procedures. The Reinvestigation Section plans to list the following designations in that block on the case control card captioned "Type":

Staff - CD/7
GSA - CD/7
GSI - CD/7
Other - CD/7

The Counterintelligence Section administrative case control will be similar to that currently being utilized by FIOB/SRS and the management will be under the direct responsibility of the Chief, Research Branch. It is envisioned that the Operational Support Branch will handle field investigation requirements for this section.

The remaining actions of the Reinvestigation Section, which involve file reviews only, will be controlled by the means of a duplicate charge out card. The current SRS hard card system will be utilized by the CI Section.

Case Management

Reinvestigation Section The desk supervisor will be responsible for the management of each case assigned to the section from inception to completion. He will obtain updated biographic information via a form letter to the subject (the form letter will be changed to give new return address information). On the basis of this information, he will initiate letters of assignment to the field offices, review reports on TWX's sent in by the field for content and possible leads, will initiate any follow-up correspondence to the field as necessary, and will close out completely favorable cases.

The Reinvestigation Section desk supervisor will prepare a memorandum in any case considered questionable setting forth the appropriate information pertaining to the subject, indicate his analysis of the information, and forward said information with the case file to the Research Branch Chief who in turn will review the case for CI aspects, make appropriate comments, and forward the appraisal to the Chief, Staff and Operations Branch, Clearance Division.

In order to facilitate this program, the personnel of the Staff and Operations Branch should forward those cases reviewed which show that a reinvestigation has not been conducted within the past five years. A similar requirement should be levied against other cognizant DD/PSI components.

Counterintelligence Section The Research Branch Chief will be responsible for the management of each case assigned to this Section from its inception to completion. When field investigation is required, coordination will be effected with either the Staff and Operations Branch, or the Operational Support Branch, Security Support Division, whichever is deemed most appropriate.

The work of the CI Section will be closely coordinated with the CI Specialist, Clearance Division. Appropriate memoranda of a CI nature will be forwarded to both the Chief, Clearance Division and the CI Specialist, particularly in those CI cases involving past and current Staff and Contract assets. In addition, periodic case status reports will be prepared and forwarded to the above on those cases requiring long term research and investigation. It is anticipated that a periodically updated "Watch List" will be prepared for the Chief, Clearance Division, the CI Specialist, and the Branch Chiefs of the Staff and Operations Branch and the Industrial and Certification Branch pertaining to specific items of information about which the Research Branch has a continuing interest. Information developed in these areas should be forwarded to the Research Branch in addition to those cases having specific CI connotations in their own right.

Work Flow

No truly basic changes are contemplated at the present other than the direction of Research Branch pertinent memoranda to the attention of the Chief, Clearance Division. Concurrently, and at the discretion of the Chief, Clearance Division, and in coordination with the CI Specialist, CI research will be levied against the Research Branch.

Implementation

Phase I

Implementation In Place

1. X-10 working days. Completed work flow consolidation for the Reinvestigation Program to the Chief, Research Branch.
2. X-10 working days. Familiarization procedure for the Reinvestigation Section desk supervisor with the new case control card system.
3. X-10 working days. Notification to field offices of any changes in procedure which would affect them.
4. X-10 working days. Notification of interested components of the Agency of any change in procedures which would affect them.

5. X-10 working days. Consolidation of work flow of transferred SRS functions to the responsibility of new components.
6. X-30 (?) working days. Transfer of "Imprest Funds" affecting transferred SRS functions to those components becoming responsible for the transferred function. It is understood that the CI Specialist will maintain "Imprest Funds" affecting his functions and the function of the Research Branch.

Phase II

Complete Implementation

Complete implementation (movement of personnel, equipment, etc.) depends upon the space available. This phase will also be affected by the transfer of some SRS consolidated functions to other components, the decision as to the use of incumbents conducting these functions, or the training of new case officers, (See Tab C), and the phase out of some current SRS programs.

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8 June 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Clearance Division
Implementation Committee,
OS/DD/PSI Reorganization

FROM : 25X1A
[REDACTED]

SUBJECT : Research Branch, Clearance Division,
OS/DD/PSI, Implementation

1. As a foundation for instant memorandum, a memorandum was directed to the Director of Security, by the Chief, Security Research Staff, dated 1 June 1973, which outlined the basic functions of SRS. Such action was considered appropriate inasmuch as the Director of Security or his predecessor had levied most of the priority functions of SRS. The Director of Security was requested to consider each function, to determine if the function should continue, continue on a low priority, or should be discontinued. The Director of Security was given the option to indicate his estimate of the possible placement of functions that were to be continued. SRS suggestions as to possible placement, including total placement of all functions in the Research Branch, were incorporated.
2. As you are aware, in response, via a memorandum dated 4 June 1973, the Director of Security provided his suggestions, coupled with those of the Deputy Director of Security. However, the Director of Security specified that the placement of each function should more properly be considered by the Reorganization Task Force as a whole in the context of the total implementation of the plan.
3. Attached for your information are blind memoranda reflecting the suggestions of the Director of Security as to continuance of SRS functions and their possible placement in the reorganization. Those SRS functions to be discontinued are not incorporated in instant memorandum.

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4. The writer concurs with those functions suggested to be retained by the Research Branch in every instance. Should you accept these suggestions, it is estimated that the Research Branch could commence functioning, in place, under the Chief, Clearance Division in less than a week. In essence, the Research Branch would be incorporating the functions of the Foreign Intelligence Operations Branch, SRS coupled with the Reinvestigation Program. Of course, those functions of SRS to be transferred to other components will affect those components as to the date they commence functioning within the reorganization. This aspect can best be estimated from the material in the attachments. The discontinuance of some SRS functions will take time and personnel for an effective approach, but will require that SRS remain as is and in place for a reasonable period.

5. I will take this opportunity to express my opinion that the intended T.O. of the Research Branch (especially when tasked with the Reinvestigation Program) is at a bare minimum to conduct a comprehensive counterintelligence program for the Office of Security.

6. The Deputy Chief, Security Research Staff, who will presumably initially hold the new position of C.I. Specialist, Clearance Division, has expressed the desire to occupy space within the complex housing the Research Branch. His desire, coupled with his expertise, his necessary guidance, and CI research material and mutual file access, dictates that this approach should be highly considered.

7. The officer handling the Reinvestigation Program has advised that the administration of his program requires his full time as well as the full time of his secretary. The question must be considered as to who will conduct the interviews relative to this program. It is recommended that a Special Agent from the Washington Field Office be detailed to the Clearance Division for this action.

8. The following attachments are included:

Functions Recommended for the Research Branch

Estimated Space and Storage Requirements for the CI Specialist and the Research Branch

Current and Continuing Functions of SAOB/SRS which could be Handled by Other than the Research Branch

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Current and Continuing Functions of LEOB/SRS which
could be Handled by Other than the Research Branch

Current SRS Furniture/Classified Storage Inventory

9. The above, with Attachments, are for your consideration.

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AC/FIOB/SRS

Attachments:

As Stated

Addendum to Attachments: Current Functions of FIOB/SRS
which could be Handled by other than the Research Branch

JGB:jrg

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Estimated Space and Storage Requirements for the CI Specialist and the Research Branch, (Not to include desk safes which should be part of the desk of each Branch professional and secretary.)

CI Specialist

Office and furnishings
Non-attributable telephone
10 Four Drawer safes

CI Specialist Secretary

Separate space and furnishings
Storage cabinet (supplies)
Coat Rack
2 Four Drawer safes

Research Branch

Branch Chief office and furnishings

1 Four Drawer safe
1 Two Drawer safe
1 work table

Vault or secure area circa 10' X 10'

1 copy machine
Storage shelves

Branch open storage and work tables, etc.

3 book shelf cabinets (5 shelves each)
1 supply cabinet
1 work table for viewer and paper cutter
2 coat racks

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Branch Professionals

- 4 work areas and furnishings
- 9 four drawer safes (5 for reinvestigation)
- 1 two drawer safe
- 1 classified card storage container for reinvestigation

Branch Secretarial

- 2 work areas and furnishings
- 1 case control/processing table area

All desk areas except the CI Specialist should be equipped with desk, desk safe, and side tables, (either typing or work).

All Branch desks should have a telephone (both red and black lines) with a centralized receiving control and buzzer systems. The CI Specialist and his secretary should be on a separate system.

The current total four drawer safe storage capacity (not including vault shelves, but including desk safes)=42.

The projected total four drawer safe storage capacity for the Research Branch (not including vault shelves, but including desk safes)=24.
(To include 6 from Reinvestigations).

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Current and Continuing Functions of SAOB/SRS which could be Handled
by Other than the Research Branch

<u>Function</u>	<u>Suggested Placement</u>
Liaison with Counterintelligence Counterparts and others in other agencies, servicing other OS components request for investigative and polygraph data, etc. (NSA, ASA, NSGC, DIA, DIS, OSI, ACSI, NIS, AID, USIA, State, CSC, ONNI, etc.)	Staff and Operations Branch

Although this function is presently divided among three officers of this Staff, with the Deputy Chief, SRS, handling the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Chief, Liaison and External Operations Branch handling the Civil Service Commission, day-to-day liaison with the United States Information Agency, the Naval Investigative Service, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, and SAOB handling the remainder, this Attachment will deal only with those liaison activities accomplished by SAOB but is written on the presumption that one full-time officer, through compression and with some lengthening of response time, can fulfill all the liaison tasks, less the FBI which will be assigned to the Chief, Clearance Division, if the suggestions of the D/S and DD/S are adopted by the sub-committee.

(1) National Security Agency--This is the highest demand liaison activity conducted by SAOB and accounts for about half of the man-day of the officer performing the liaison function. Requests to NSA generally exceed requests from NSA. Naturally, there is some brokering between NSA which involves other than routine activities between the two agencies, and this aspect proves quite time consuming, but the bulk of the product deals with the category known as "dual applicants," i. e., individuals who have applied for employment with both agencies or who previously worked for one and now are applying for the other.

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The foregoing only skims the major problems involved with NSA and does not deal with the regular, but less routine, requests from NSA which require an IP trace and coordination of release of the resultant information to NSA with the controlling DD/O component and any number of situations which result from such in-depth liaison. The liaison also entails exchange visits with NSA, a time-consuming "chore" because of the distance involved and the difference in working hours of the two agencies.

(2) Secondary in demand upon the liaison officer's time is liaison with the Army Security Agency, the Naval Security Group Command, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Office of Special Investigations, USAF. The liaison with ASA and NSGC is handled by Gray phone, and like NSA, frequently requires discussions of codeword information. The prime customer from this end is again the present Personnel Security Division, though not limited to it. Both ASA and NSGC maintain

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Liaison with DIA and OSI are enhanced in that they have "roving" liaison officers, badged for entry into the Headquarters Building because of other offices than OS with whom they also have liaison. The liaison, like the others, is a two-way street and involves cases of individual

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The liaison in both directions with ASA, NSGC, DIA and OSI account for some 25% of the liaison officer's time. In the case of ASA and NSGC the bulk of the requests flow from CIA to these agencies; in the case of DIA and OSI, it flows primarily in the opposite direction.

(3) The remainder of the liaison officer's time is consumed by requests, again in both directions, involving a variety of federal agencies, including the Department of State, Agency for International Development, the U.S. Information Agency, and the Department of Commerce, all of which serve to funnel to this Agency information concerning Agency employees [REDACTED]. In addition, normal name checking is conducted in both directions, the prime customer in this Agency being PSD. Recently, we established a working relationship with and have conducted name checks for the Defense Investigative Service. (It might be noted that the AID and USIA liaison is conducted on a most discreet basis through the Directors of Security of those agencies and with the Deputy Director of Security of the Department of Commerce (mostly JPRS situations), all long-time friends of the liaison officer. Similarly, the recently established liaison with DIS is through a long-time friend of the liaison officer. These liaison situations are particularly enhanced through these relationships and would initially be less productive in the hands of the successor liaison officer.) Liaison with the special activities unit of the Office of Security, Department of State, has continued for some twenty years of which about ten years have been by the present liaison officer and has been without compromise. Another recently established liaison effort

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has been with the Office of National Narcotics Intelligence, Department of Justice, again initiated at both ends by long-time friends; name checks have been exchanged and the effort appears to be producing.

There are several other agencies such as Coast Guard Intelligence, Federal Aviation Agency, and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, all of which play only a negligible role in the liaison effort at this time and are limited to only occasional contacts, except for LEAA. The LEAA situation has changed to one more suitable for transfer to ORD and [REDACTED] has so recommended.

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STORAGE: Much of the return from these liaison activities is placed in the appropriate security files on which PSD and IOS have based the inquiries. On incoming inquiries, however, it has been necessary to maintain a separate file to provide a chronological reference file of what was asked, and more importantly, what we responded. Other than desk safes it would be expected that at least one four drawer safe and an area suitable for the storage of SI material (NSA, ASA, and NSGC) and Gray phone, is required.

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OPERATIONAL FUNDS REQUIRED: None are expended in this effort.

OVERLAP TIME REQUIRED: To insert a new case officer, it would probably take only a minimal briefing and introductions to accomplish a pro forma liaison relationship, albeit not

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
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particularly productive from the standpoint of what information we need. It should, therefore, allow an overlap period of several months with the replacement "switch-hitting" on the liaison tasks, with guidance from the predecessor as to how different situations are handled for the protection of the liaison activity and the successor liaison officer. The successor liaison officer should have authority for certain freedom in latitude of response to expedite arrival at the point that "mutual blackmail" is developed and a free exchange can reoccur. For dealings with ASA, NSA, and NSGC, the successor should, of course, have approval to deal with SI and will have to gain sufficient familiarity with it to determine how much of it can be sterilized or adapted to be contained in a security file.

Function

Suggested Placement

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Current and Continuing Functions of LEOB/SRS which could be Handled by Other than the Research Branch:

<u>Function</u>	<u>Suggested Placement</u>
Liaison with Counterintelligence Counterparts and others in other Agencies.	Staff and Operations Branch

These requests originate from within SRS and other components of OS on items deemed to need special handling for reasons of sensitivity or need for expeditious treatment. As a two way street, requests are received from counterparts. Actions involves the passage of information orally and in writing. Contact is potentially with: ACSI; AID; OSI; BNND; CSC; Department of Commerce; State Department; IRS; Department of Labor; ONIS; Secret Service; and USIA. As practical matter, most contact recently has been with ACSI; CSC, ONI and USIA.

The time expended on this function varies but on the average, including processing and analysis of requests, probably entails 2-4 hours weekly.

The storage requirements, other than control files held in desk safe for convenience, would be minimal-records covering past actions and not yet destroyed.

The frequency of contact is spasmodic as need generates. The contacts are weekly or more often with USIA and CSC.

No operational funds are required.

The overlap time required for the inception of a new case officer would probably take a half-day briefing, etc. Some introductions of individuals would be required.

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Space
& Communications
Equipment

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CLEARANCE DIVISION

SPACE, COMMUNICATIONS AND EQUIPMENT

Space

In accordance with guidance received, we considered all space currently occupied by Office of Security components. In order to achieve the objectives of an orderly realignment of assigned functions with the least disruption of existing activities and personnel and the best utilization of available space, it was concluded that the Clearance Division should be located on the third floor. Recommended space allocations are as follows:

Office of Chief

Would be located in 3E-34. Space for the Chief and Deputy Chief would consist of private offices and space for two (2) secretaries and an additional room to store 200 sq. ft. of personnel files; total space equals 815 sq. ft. This area now is a secure area which would be modified by the allocation of the remaining 292 sq. ft. of the present room to the Staff and Operations Branch as shown on the attached floor plan (See Tab D).

Staff and Operations Branch

The 292 feet area referred to above would be utilized as office space for the Branch Chief, the GS-14 Security Officer, and a secretary. The remainder of the Branch would be located in Rooms 3E-44 and 3E-47. The total 25X9
[REDACTED]
sq. ft. per person. Room 3E-44 is a secure area.

Industrial and Certification Branch

This Branch would be located in Rooms 3E-36 and 3E-29. The total space allocated to the Branch is
[REDACTED]
personnel.

25X9

Research Branch

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This Branch would be located in Room 3E-49 and would consist of space for [REDACTED] Staff personnel, including private office space for the CI Specialist. The total [REDACTED]

25X9


It is recommended that the entire area be made into a secure area. As an interim measure, it is recommended that the secure area located in Room GE-42 be utilized (if required) for storage of sensitive Research Branch files.

Communications

A gray phone line will be required by the Research Branch - the gray phone line in 4E-13 or GE-79 could be moved to the designated area on the third floor.

A green phone line will be required by the Industrial and Certification Branch. The green phone line currently utilized by the Support Division on the first floor could be reassigned to the designated third floor location.

25X1A



Equipment

Existing copying equipment currently utilized by ID/3 and SRS will be required and moved to designated space for the Staff and Operations Branch and Research Branch, respectively.

25X1A

A separate report is being submitted covering requirements for implementation of the [REDACTED] Program.

Minimum requirements for secure areas for storage of classified files is covered above under Space. The safes used by the Overt Branch that are currently used for temporary files would be surplus in Phase II, Complete Implementation, and could be used if additional classified storage is required pending completion of recommended construction of secure areas (see comment under Phase II below).

Implementation

Phase I

Implementation In Place

Implementation in place could be accomplished in X-20 working days inasmuch as all components of the Clearance Division have adequate space (including secure areas), communications, and equipment.

Phase II


Complete Implementation

Complete implementation, without major alterations of space as recommended above, assuming facilities are available for the movement of personnel and equipment could probably be implemented in X-30 working days.

Complete implementation with recommended alterations consisting of making Rooms 3E-36, 3E-29, 3E-44, and 3E-49 into secure areas would be difficult to estimate; however, based on priorities assigned, it would probably take from X-100 to X-180 working days.

Approved For Release 2001/05/02 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700010020-8

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25X1A

OS Program

CLEARANCE DIVISION

25X1A

-OS Program

The Clearance Division should plan for two terminals each within the working areas of (1) the Staff and Operations Branch, and (2) the Industrial and Certification Branch. Two terminals should be in juxtaposition near the point where case processing papers and files are received and sent from each Branch.

At this time, there are lines and outlets for two terminals near the dumbwaiter on the third floor. The outlets are in Room 3E-29 in the space presently occupied by the Reinvestigation Section of the Clearance Support Branch. Other lines and outlets are presently located on the fourth floor as follows: One (1) set is near the dumbwaiter in Room 4E-33 in the area presently occupied by the Overt Branch; and two (2) sets are located about fifteen feet from the hallway and separated by the partition which divides the Covert Branch from the Special Clearance. Thus, there is presently one (1) outlet in the present Covert Branch area (Room 4E-27) and one (1) in the present Special Clearance Branch area (Room 4E-25). If it should be decided that the two Branches will be located on one floor, lines and outlets can be requested as a part of overall work order for such an arrangement. Since [redacted] terminals will operate from the grid system, it is not a major operation to change the number or location of terminal lines.

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A The concept that [redacted] terminals may be used to query [redacted] may, or may not, be valid. Certain software changes must be made before the Delta Data terminals (which will be used for [redacted]) can be used to query [redacted] access can best be provided through the use of special [redacted] terminals or through part-time use of the [redacted]-OS terminals, will be a decision in which OJCS technicians would participate.

25X1A

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25X1A

25X1A [redacted] access can be provided. At this time, it can not be determined whether special lines and terminals would be required. At any rate, the provision of lines and outlets would not be a major problem if it is decided that access to [redacted] is desired.

25X1A

25X1A

The Reorganization's biggest impact on [REDACTED] is in the area of the program logic and the architecture of design. Changes in paper flow, in control listings, in component names and in report formats will require some re-examination. Meaningful re-examination of the [REDACTED] design, however, must await decisions by the Reorganization Implementation Committee which will establish the types of cases and the functions which are to be handled by the new components.

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